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NOVA CS, UNAF

II. WHAT HAS BEEN THE EFFECT TO DATE OF CONTROLS ON TRADE WITH  
COMMUNIST CHINA ON THE CAPABILITIES OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST  
REGIMES?

20 Feb 53

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C. What has been the effect of the economic dislocations  
covered in (B) above upon Communist China's military capabilities,  
especially in Korea?

It is recommended that the first sentence of paragraph 22,  
page 5, of the published copy of SE-27 be changed to read -----  
-----and supplies including avgas and jet fuel, present Western  
control-----.

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V. WHAT WOULD BE THE EFFECTS OF BOMBARDING TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES IN COMMUNIST CHINA IN CONJUNCTION WITH A NAVAL BLOCKADE?

A. There have been no changes in the critical transport targets within Communist China as listed in paragraph 50 of SE-27.

It is recommended, however, that the words "reported to be", in line fourteen (14), third sentence of paragraph 50 of the published copy be deleted because this rail line is now operative.

B. What would be the effect on Communist China's ability to sustain military operations in Korea of successful and sustained air bombardment of such targets?

It is recommended that paragraph 51 of the published copy of SE-27 be retained in answer to the above question.

D. What are Communist capabilities to resist air bombardment of such targets?

1. Communist China's air defensive capabilities merit careful examination in any consideration of the vulnerability of the area to systematic air bombardment of transportation facilities. Present defensive capabilities are due directly to Soviet active participation in supplying equipment, operational procedures, training and in many instances Soviet personnel. In assessing such capabilities the following factors are pertinent:

a. Fighter Aircraft. Approximately 21 jet fighter regiments (Mig-15) are located in the Mukden-Antung complex. In China proper there are two Chinese Communist Air Force jet fighter regiments based at Canton (Mig-9 and Mig-15), two Mig-15 regiments based in the Liuting area near the Shantung Peninsula, and two fighter regiments (1 piston, 1 jet) based in the Shanghai area.

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b. Early Warning (Radar/Visual): The Chinese Communists have continued to develop their early warning system during the past two years with the assistance of Soviet engineers, technicians and advisers. The radar early warning system is believed to provide almost complete coverage from the Manchurian/Soviet border south along the coast to Hainan Island area, with GCI and gun laying radar located in key military and industrial areas, particularly in Manchuria. Information concerning the deployment of radar in internal China is lacking; however, it is believed that some coverage is afforded major industrial and IOC targets. The EW/GCI coverage over most of the Korea-Manchuria area is believed to be relatively effective. However, EW/GCI equipment in some areas of central and southern China are believed to be obsolescent which would limit the effectiveness of these nets. Also, communications nets are considered to be relatively inferior for effective operation of EW and control nets. The Chinese Communists are gradually integrating some "L" and "S" band radar in the more important target areas.

c. Anti-Aircraft: The heaviest concentrations of antiaircraft guns are located in the Mukden area, Shanghai, and in the vicinity of Canton. These defenses appear to be employed for the protection of industrial area, harbor facilities, airfields, and major junctions in the communications and supply systems. It is believed that the Chinese Communists are utilizing 12.7 mm, 37mm, and 85mm Soviet antiaircraft weapons; 75mm Japanese automatic weapons; and it is possible that the Chinese Communists may be equipped with assorted antiaircraft weapons furnished under lend-lease during World War II.

2. In view of the foregoing the air defense capabilities of the Chinese Communists are estimated to be:

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a. In the Mukden-Antung area of southern Manchuria the Chinese Communists possess an effective air defense capability against daylight bombing missions; however, under limited visibility conditions their air defense capabilities would be weak to ineffective.

b. Chinese Communist air defense capabilities for China proper are considerably less due to the extensive area and lack of sufficient quantities of necessary equipment.

c. Under conditions of prolonged operations the ability of the Chinese Communists to maintain effectiveness would be in direct proportion to the amount of support which the Soviets would continue to render.

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VI. WHAT ARE THE PRESENT AND POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST TO BLOCKADE THE CHINA COAST AND TO CONDUCT AIR STRIKES AGAINST INLAND LINES OF COMMUNICATION?

B. What are the capabilities of the Chinese Nationalists to conduct air strikes against lines of communication on the China Mainland?

The Chinese Nationalist Air Force (CNAF), as presently constituted, possesses a low combat capability. The CNAF consists of 20 B-24's, 21 B-25's, 70 F-47's, and 56 F-51's. If this total strength were utilized to conduct air strikes against lines of communication on the China mainland, the CNAF might initially inflict some damage on a few of the transportation facilities. However, because of CNAF logistic and maintenance deficiencies and a Chinese Communist capability for counter-air operations, CNAF air attacks against the mainlands would be seriously limited in effectiveness and duration.

C. What are the capabilities of the Chinese Nationalist to utilize additional air and naval equipment to augment their capabilities for blockading the China coast and interfering with inland lines of communication?

Increased US logistical support of the CNAF would pose a serious potential threat to the Chinese Communists. A revitalized and properly equipped CNAF could attack the majority of the principal transportation facilities of central and south China. Although such attacks would not be decisive in defeating the Chinese Communists, the CCAF would be forced to deploy substantial fighter strength from Manchuria and northeast China to central and south China, thus weakening Communist air strength in the Korean theater.

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It is presently planned to supply the CNAF by the end of 1955, with 150 F-47's, 75 F-64's, 150 F-86's, 18 T-33's, 18 E-24's and Privateers. There are about 1750 pilots trained in the operation of conventional aircraft, and 32 are presently undergoing jet training in the US.

It is believed that if an intensive program of jet transitional training were instituted in conjunction with considerably increased training in maintenance the CNAF could absorb a larger number of aircraft provided they were made available.

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VII. WHAT WOULD BE THE PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTION?

3. A naval blockade and an air bombardment of inland lines of communication?

It is reasonable to assume that the Chinese Communists would take all possible military countermeasures to minimize the effect of an air bombardment of her inland lines of communication. They would probably exert their maximum air defense capability as well as request additional Soviet assistance under the terms of the Sino-Soviet Treaty.

The USSR would probably react to UN air attacks on Communist China by immediately increasing support to the Chinese Communists to the maximum practicable extent short of commitment of its own air forces to combat in areas outside Communist control. Soviet air units would probably participate in the air defense of Manchuria and North China, ostensibly as part of the CCAF. In the event that such raids by the UN reached serious proportions in Communist China, CCAF operations would possibly be extended to include the bombing of US installations in Japan, Okinawa, South Korea, and elsewhere.

4. A naval blockade and air bombardment by the Chinese Nationalists alone?

It can be expected that the Chinese Communists will counter any CNAF attempt to bomb their transportation facilities by exerting their air defense capabilities to the maximum. Immediate retaliation against CNAF losses in Formosa can also be expected provided sufficient US forces are not in the area. However, the CCAF might retaliate regardless of the presence of US forces if air bombardment efforts of Communist China were unusually successful.

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